Archive for the ‘Russo-Japanese War’ Category

Caring for Imperial Russia’s Sick and Wounded Soldiers

Sunday, November 27th, 2011

I heard about a lot of interesting new work at the ASEEES conference this year, and one of the exciting things ASEEES was the way in which research at one panel complemented and extended research presented in an entirely different context. The way in which the Russian Empire handled the medical demands of war is one of those serendipitous moments.

I served as commenter on a panel loosely defined as veterans in Russian and Soviet history, but ended up being a wider ranging discussion on war and society in broad terms. One paper by Andrew Ringlee, a graduate student at North Carolina, looked at the Red Cross and its de facto role as the Russian Army’s medical service prior to World War I.

Though Ringlee’s research is still in its early stages, he has some intriguing findings. The Russian Red Cross might have been the largest and most significant of the various national chapters, and likewise might have invented the modern concept of disaster relief: stay tuned for the dissertation for full discussion of that point. On the specific question of the Russian military, the Russian Red Cross had its first experience handling sick and wounded soldiers in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, where its performance was remarkably good and well-regarded by the Russian educated public. Despite the normal frictions and difficulties we extent under such circumstances, the results were clearly positive. In 1904-05, however, the Russo-Japanese War proved quite different. The Red Cross was less effective, in part because of the remote theater of war and in part because the Russian Army’s failure to properly integrate the Red Cross into its planning. More importantly, the Russian public believed the Red Cross to have failed, and to have squandered its resources through incompetence and corruption.

What struck me about the story Ringlee told was the way in which the Russian high command expected its medical needs to be met by the Red Cross, and yet made no effort to integrate the Red Cross into its contingency planning or to provide it with the information and resources it would require to deal successfully with the challenges of war. Part of the reason seems to have been a deep official mistrust of Russian civil society. Though Ringlee has not yet taken his research into the First World War, there are clear parallels to the poisonous relationship between state and civil society we see in that period.

Peter Waldron (University of East Anglia) picked up the story in a roundtable on health and living standards in World War I and World War II by looking specifically at epidemic disease in the First World War. Many of the themes of Ringlee’s work–relatively successful efforts by Russian civil society to deal with a crisis, and tsarist indifference or hostility–were equally clear in Waldron’s.

Waldron provided a wealth of welcome data on the nature of disease in the war–of the five million hospitalized Russian soldiers during the war, just under half were there because of contagious disease. The biggest killer was cholera, which killed a third of all those it infected and accounted for 20% of all disease fatalities, but the most prevalent disease was typhoid. Despite the difficult conditions of wartime, Russian public health had made remarkable strides even since the 1890s. A cholera epidemic in 1892 had killed half of those it infected, rather than the third who succumbed during the war.

The pattern of disease is what we might predict: concentrated behind Russian front lines and in big cities, particularly Moscow. Though the precise reasons for this remain to be determined, Waldron found that while wounded soldiers were widely scattered around Russia, infected soldiers were concentrated in Moscow. It’s difficult to know what to make of this: given the city’s importance as an industrial and transportation center, and the huge numbers of vulnerable refugees in Moscow, dumping disease-carriers there would seem a really bad idea. This is hard to imagine as a result of deliberate policy. Of course, we are talking about Nicholas II, so deliberate policy is certainly a possibility.

In terms of the bigger theme, though, Waldron amply confirmed the pattern of the Russian state having a terrible time working effectively and productively with private initiatives. While Waldron did not discuss the Red Cross, he did bring in the Union of Towns, which had a great deal of responsibility for aiding the sick. Desperate for assistance, the Union of Towns begged for help in setting up hospitals, only to find the the tsarist government slow and grudging in its responses. In a remarkable range of circumstances, not simply care for sick and wounded soldiers, this seems to be the rule.

US President wins Nobel Peace Prize! (No, not that one.)

Friday, October 9th, 2009

In case you’ve been living in a deep dark cave, you may not have heard that Barack Obama won the Nobel Peace Prize. Most news stories I’ve seen, to their credit, have mentioned previous American presidents to win. The first was Theodore Roosevelt, indeed the first American to win any of the Nobels, who won it in 1906 for something directly related to Russian military history: the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth which ended the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War.

Roosevelt was awarded the prize, according to the Nobel committee, for his
“happy role in bringing to an end the bloody war recently waged between two of the world’s great powers, Japan and Russia.” Roosevelt brokered the peace talks, which took place predominantly in Portsmouth, New Hampshire thanks to its relatively cool climate.

The standard story has long been that Russia was decisively defeated on the battlefield, and only two things saved Russia from a far more draconian peace: first, the diplomatic skill of Sergei Witte, Russia’s chief negotiator at Portsmouth, and, second, Roosevelt’s tipping the scales in favor of the Russians. This last is often attributed to a desire to maintain a balance in the Pacific or out of racial solidarity with the Russians. My sense of the literature is that this conventional wisdom is getting a little shaky; the Japanese were running short of men and especially money, so both sides were interested in settling things in a peace of exhaustion. Bruce Menning’s Bayonets before Bullets is particularly good as a brief introduction to the battlefield developments.

In any event, as a sitting president, Roosevelt did not travel to Norway to accept the prize until four years later, visiting only in 1910 as part of world travel and lecture tour. I’d never read his Nobel lecture–looking at it now, I’m struck by two ideas that seem to belong to a later post-war era–one of Bolshevik revolution and pacifist utopianism, but already clear to Roosevelt in 1910. One is his emphasis on the need to prevent class warfare. His initial acceptance of the prize by telegram in 1906 originally included his intent to use the prize monies to support industrial peace; in fact, the money was spent after World War I on causes relating to war relief. Roosevelt’s son Quentin was killed in the war; two other sons were wounded.

But speaking in 1910, he was still preoccupied with the need to avert class warfare, something that he’d spent a lot of time on as president. Labor militancy, industrialist greed, and middle-class consumerism were equally dangerous:

in our complex industrial civilization of today the peace of righteousness and justice, the only kind of peace worth having, is at least as necessary in the industrial world as it is among nations. There is at least as much need to curb the cruel greed and arrogance of part of the world of capital, to curb the cruel greed and violence of part of the world of labor, as to check a cruel and unhealthy militarism in international relationships. . . No nation deserves to exist if it permits itself to lose the stern and virile virtues; and this without regard to whether the loss is due to the growth of a heartless and all-absorbing commercialism, to prolonged indulgence in luxury and soft, effortless ease, or to the deification of a warped and twisted sentimentality.

Roosevelt’s other priority was international organization, presaging the League of Nations and later United Nations. He wanted extensive arbitration treaties, at least among “all really civilized communities,” along with strengthening of the international judicial institutions already in existence at the Hague. Finally, he wanted the world’s powers to create a “League of Peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others.” Recognizing the problem of enforcement, Roosevelt envisioned a policing power made up of the great powers “which sincerely desire peace and have no thought themselves of committing aggressions.” He clearly includes here the United States, probably Britain, maybe France, but it’s not evident to me who else he includes in his list. What seems implicit is his idea that the great states ought to be, and at least some are, status quo powers, satisfied in their possessions and uninterested in expanding them. World War I would make that view difficult to sustain.

Russo-Turkish War as World War Zero

Sunday, August 23rd, 2009

Nice to have John Steinberg as one of our frontoviki.  Welcome aboard, John.

On the issue Steinberg raises of World War Zero–it seems to me it happens quite often in history that  one historian argues “We think of X as the first example of category X; in actuality, earlier event Y is the first example of category X.”  The historian’s natural instinct in response to this (or at least MY natural instinct) is to go back to a still earlier event Z.

Let me throw out one of my favorites: the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War.

How does it measure up against Steinberg’s ten criteria?

1.  Imperialist competition.  Check.
2.  Began in a neutral country .  Check–here I have in mind the war’s origins in the Orthodox states of the Balkans, slowly moving towards autonomy / full independence from the Ottoman Empire.
3. Breakdown of government and humanitarian crisis.  Check–especially the latter.  Atrocities in the Balkans are one of the things that kept British public opinion somewhat more sympathetic to Russia.
4. Lethality of industrial warfare.  Check.  Bruce Menning’s Bayonets before Bullets is particularly good on the impact of breech-loading rifles and improved artillery on the battlefield.
5.  Mass casualties.  Check.
6.  Long battles.  Half-check–field engagements are relatively quick and localized, but sieges draw out at Plevna because of the lethality of modern firepower.
7.  Cost and financial difficulty.  Check, I think.  I don’t happen to know a great deal on the financial side of the war, but the Russian Ministry of Finance was always upset about the state of the ruble.
8. Widespread reporting.  Check.  The Pan-Slavs stir up Russian opinion and get Russian volunteers to the Balkans well before official Russian entry, and reporting of Ottoman atrocities in Western Europe gives Russia useful diplomatic cover.
9.  Peace of exhaustion and seeds of future conflict and 10. Future destabliization.  Emphatically check and check.

AND you can throw in as well that the Russo-Turkish War and World War I started over, to use Bismarck’s phrase, “some damn fool thing in the Balkans,” and even more specifically Serbian nationalism.

To be sure, my argument for the Russo-Japanese War as World War Zero, making the Russo-Japanese War World War Point Five, could easily be overturned by precisely the same method.   I’ll leave it as an exercise for the student to make a case for the Crimean War as the REAL World War Zero.

World War Zero?

Saturday, August 22nd, 2009

On May 15th 2009 I had the opportunity to give a lecture to a group of about 100 members of the History faculty and students at Huazhong Normal University in Wuhan, China. The lecture was based on new archival research conducted in support of a recently published two-volume set The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero which I edited along with several colleagues.

After briefly summarizing the operational history of the War, I offered ten reasons why new research findings justify the conclusion that the Russo-Japanese War should be considered World War Zero.

1. Like World War I, the origins of the Russo-Japanese War were rooted in imperialistic competition between world powers

2. As in August 1914, when the Russo-Japanese conflict began, it was fought in a neutral country(s) (China and Korea)

3. In the midst of the conflict and in the area where combat occurred, governmental structures broke down and the emergency was greeted with a response by non-governmental agencies such as the Red Cross

4. The conflict was marked by the use of sophisticated, complicated, and (above all else) lethal industrial weapons such as machine guns, rapid fire infantry assault weapons, rapid fire artillery, mines, and torpedoes. These were accompanied by the logistical infrastructure needed to keep ammunition and other essential supplies flowing to modern fielded armies

5. The natural product of the War’s deadly battlefields — mass casualties — required levels of aid which no medical corps of the period had the ability to help. The sheer numbers of men in need of aid overwhelmed these units.

6. The duration of battles at the beginning of the War lasted two or three days (The Yalu and Nanshan) and were contained to relatively small areas.  By the end of the war the battles of Liaoyang and Mukden lasted weeks and featured battlefields that extended for kilometers.  [NB: In terms of duration and brutality, the six to seven-month siege of Port Arthur foreshadowed what later happened at Verdun in 1916.]

7. The cost of fighting such a technologically demanding war required the formation of international syndicates of bankers simply to derive the credit needed for both the Japanese and Russians to keep purchasing and producing weapons and munitions.

8. Like WWI, the Russo-Japanese War was widely reported on and represented in all forms of visual presentations, from photographs to wood block prints.

9. Like Versailles, the Treaty of Portsmouth occurred only after one belligerent (Japan) ran out of men, materials and credit, and the Russians found themselves in the midst of a Revolution.  Perhaps more to the point, the treaty itself resolved little beyond ending hostilities and, worse, created circumstances that fueled grievances that culminated in future conflict.

10.  When the war concluded and the peace was signed the strengthening of the pan-Asian movement continued to fuel animosities that further destabilized the world.

How well did my Chinese audience accept the logic of the Russo-Japanese War as World War Zero?  While the faculty liked the idea, they accepted it with much circumspection.  More surprising were the questions I received from the students which suggested that they had little knowledge of the conflict in general.  Whatever the case, the students were far more interested in discussing Japan’s role in the Asian world during the first half of the 20th century.  The students were particularly curious to know my thoughts on to possible re-emergence of Japan as a world power in the 21st century.

As for the concept of World War Zero, most western military historians continue to view the Russo-Japanese War as a regional conflict rooted in the age of imperialism. Historians in Asia, appear much more respective.  I remain a World War Zero advocate. And I look forward to continuing public discussion of the War’s legacy, especially when that discussion is conducted within a new international frame of reference.