To the outside observer, this would sound like two opposed organizations. This being Russia, of course, appearances can be deceiving. Only a few of the speeches and statements have been released, but what’s available so far suggests that there was much more about openness and access than there was about secrecy. Being generally bitter and cynical by nature, I was expecting only boilerplate (and there was, to be sure, plenty of that), but there was a remarkable amount of substantive information on offer. In particular, historians of Russia owe it to themselves to read the speech of Rosarkhiv head A. N. Artizov in full.

Chair of the meeting was S. E. Naryshkin, head of Medvedev’s Presidential Administration. His remarks were quite brief, and opened with a very vague set of goals for the meeting: “perspectives on the development of archival affairs, working out and realization of a series of measures directed at supporting a just and objective representation of Russian history.” This is, of course, not especially enlightening.

It did get better though. Naryshkin conceded that the falsification and anti-Russian history that Russian political leaders have been getting so worked up about are largely the result of bad access to documents. In Naryshkin’s words, “lack or inaccessibility of information becomes the condition and reason for falsification.” This makes the most important step “further declassification of archival documents.”

Naryshkin also set priorities for the Russian archival system. His first was electronic access–both the preservation of newly-generated electronic documents (not a big deal for most historians, at least not now) and improving electronic access to existing collections.

Next came access to documents, in which Naryshkin actually referred to the “society’s right of free access to information.” This was immediately followed by a qualification to “strictly provide for the security of the state and respect the rights of citizens,” but the very idea of treating access to archival information as a right, even if phrased in social rather than individual terms, is a major step.

A. N. Artizov’s speech was much heavier on concrete information. He noted the particular problems Russian archives face: finding qualified staff, and coping with the mass of records created by the totalizing nature of the Soviet state. Nonetheless, he touted the achievements of Russian archives in the last few years, including declassification and scholarly publication. Scans of key documents on the Katyn massacre achieved two million hits per day when made available to the public.

Veterans of reading rooms know that many of the people there are seeking to document the work or military service records of themselves or their relatives. Rosarkhiv has a new website where such inquiries can be submitted electronically. Historians of limited time and unlimited funding should note the ability to submit thematic requests for information as a paid service.

Thanks to Artizov, fans of the political use of history can look forward to a document collection that Artizov has promised will be coming soon: “the collaboration of Ukrainian nationalists with the Nazis”

Artizov had quite a bit to say about declassification. He cited 10 million files declassified since 1991, but noted how slow and labor-intensive the process is. He claimed that 1.7 million files remain classified, 1.1 million of those Communist Party or USSR government files. I should note that those numbers sound low to me. They could be true, I suppose, if they exclude some very important archives that are outside the Rosarkhiv system: the military, the foreign ministry, and the security services.

New files come in to the Rosarkhiv system at the rate of 1.5 million per year. Most notably, Artizov says the Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev fonds have all been transferred from the Kremlin’s Presidential Archive to Rosarkhiv. The bulk of the remaining Politburo archive will make the same transfer in 2010-12. Transfer doesn’t mean declassification, of course, but certainly the move from presidential to archivist hands is a good thing for researchers.

Artizov also gave some updated information on the major World War II archive that he discussed back in March. I was skeptical of this on practical and scholarly grounds, and remain so. Artizov is remarkably specific, though, which suggests that efforts proceed apace to make this archive happen. The plan for the new archive is to build it on the grounds of the existing Ministry of Defense Archive in Podol’sk. While this will certainly make the physical transfer of MoD records much simpler, it makes life much tougher for foreign researchers, who will be faced with the unenviable choices of either taking a daily elektrichka trek out from Moscow, or living all the way out in Podol’sk.

UPDATE: the links to Gabriela Mistral were dead for a while, but they appear to be back up. There’s also a newspaper clipping at a Chilean Russophile site.

UPDATE 2: The Independent tells us that this winter trip to Chile was part of a family vacation taken with the approval of Birkbeck College.

Ten years ago was the very beginning of Putin’s regime, and the heady days of Putinmania in Russia. But what’s striking in hindsight is just how much continuity there is between the tragedy of the Kursk and what’s happening in Putin and Medvedev’s Russia today. Efforts to obfuscate, emphasis on image over real action, bureaucratic inertia, half-hearted and slapdash concern for human life, deep-seated mistrust of the outside world–all of those were clear in 2000. The difference is that the Russian public seems much angrier about them 10 years on.

Let me be clear–I’m not saying that prompt action and cooperation with foreign governments would have saved the sailors on the Kursk. They did have access to an escape hatch, and the submarine was only 100 meters deep. On the other hand, in World War II, sailors trapped in the Arizona at Pearl Harbor–essentially at the surface and in the middle of a US naval base, couldn’t be rescued. My point is that Putin’s government didn’t try.

An Internet news site, lifenews.ru, first reported that on July 29, flames tore through a secret naval airbase in Kolomna, 100 kilometers (km) south-east of Moscow, destroying up to 200 aircraft worth 20 billion rubles ($600 million). Initially, the defense ministry tried to cover up the story by first declaring it to be erroneous, and then admitting that it was not an “airbase,” but logistic base office buildings, warehouses with unneeded equipment and vehicles were destroyed without any loss of life (ITAR TASS, August 3). It was later reported that the base in question ­Central Air and Technical naval base (also known as base 2512)­ has been used for 60 years to supply the entire naval aviation force with avionics, armaments, jet engines and other essential equipment (Interfax, August 3).

Medvedev did not elaborate about the equipment lost at base 2512, but implied “the consequences were heavy,” and that it was a result of “criminal negligence.” Medvedev officially reprimanded the Commander of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, and his First Deputy and Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Alexander Tatarinov. Medvedev fired the Russian navy’s Chief of Logistics, Rear Admiral Sergei Sergeyev, and the Chief of Naval aviation, Major-General Nikolai Kuklev. Medvedev ousted three colonels: the commandant of 2512 base and two of Kuklev’s deputies. Under orders from Medvedev, Defense Minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, ousted five officers that served at base 2512 (Kommersant, August 5). Medvedev declared that further dismissals were possible later, after the entire crisis is finally defused (www.news.kremlin.ru, August 4).

The severity of the punishment handed out by Medvedev for a fire at a supply base that did not involve any human casualties surely reflects his overall anger, but also would indicate a large quantity of essential equipment was lost. The replacement of supplies lost at base 2512 could require billions of rubles, years of effort and, in some cases, may be simply impossible as the crisis in Russia’s defense industry has made the production of some essential components virtually impossible. Elements of Russian naval aviation could be grounded for a long time and maybe indefinitely, including the Su-33 jet fighters on Russia’s only aircraft carrier, the Kuznetsov. The Su-33 is no longer produced and reportedly at least four new Su-33 jet engines were destroyed at base 2512 (Vedomosti, August 5). The 2512 base contained 65,000 tons of equipment, which might have been entirely destroyed. An airborne forces supply base (3370) was damaged by fire near the 2512 base, but its losses seem less significant (Kommersant, August 4).

UPDATE: Figes’ victims, Robert Service and Rachel Polonsky, make their comments at History Today, and they’re both still mad. Being threatened with libel lawsuits for telling the truth could do that, I suppose. What they say suggests that the three-month lapse between exposure and apology was related to a fight over the precise wording of Figes’ apology, which has not yet been made public. Evidently it was circulated to the circle of British academics who were copied on the original emails about the controversy, and none of them have posted it. I welcome correction if it is indeed online.

Romney is either ignorant of the workings of diplomacy or engaging in demogoguery in weighty issues of foreign policy. Neither explanation suits a potential presidential candidate. ALL treaties include clauses allowing the signatories to opt out. The United States can back out of New START as easily as Russia can. Russia’s reservation with regard to missile defense only makes explicit something which has clearly been part of Russian foreign policy since Gorbachev.

Need proof that opting out a treaty is nothing new?

Try Ronald Reagan’s 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, clause XV.2:

Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Or George H. W. Bush’s 1991 Start II, clause XVII.3:

Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Or Bill Clinton’s 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, clause IX.2-3:

Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice six months in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security Council. Notice of withdrawal shall include a statement of the extraordinary event or events which a State Party regards as jeopardizing its supreme interests.

Or George W. Bush’s 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions, clause IV.3:

Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party.

So what does New START say (clause XIV.3)?

Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty,
have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this
Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give
notice of its decision to the other Party. Such notice shall
contain a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying
Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
This Treaty shall terminate three months from the date of
receipt by the other Party of the aforementioned notice,
unless the notice specifies a later date.

What’s the difference between the opt-out clauses in the treaties negotiated by the previous four presidents and Barack Obama’s treaty? Mitt Romney’s planning on running for president against Barack Obama.

UPDATE: Fred Kaplan is equally unhappy.

I need to be sure to say that coming to historical or present-day conclusions about intelligence is very difficult. To borrow a concept from Donald Rumsfeld, the known unknowns are bad enough and the unknown unknowns are nightmarish. If it turns out that a bunch of Russian sleepers work in the Department of Defense, then I’ll look quite silly.

That said, I think there are some conclusions we can draw.

First, there’s a clear pattern in the covers of the accused spies: they’re in professions that involve a lot of travel, and provide plenty of excuses for chatting up wealthy and influential people: journalist, high-end real estate dealer, travel agent, and (best of all) consultant. The odd thing, which a number of commentators have pointed out (like here and here), is that most wealthy and influential people are happy to talk about themselves and their work. Why go to the trouble of putting an illegal in place at great cost in time and expense when open cover as a Russian journalist or a Russian firm needing to hire expertise would get just as much at a fraction of the risk? Or just google it?

Second, background checks work. None of the names that have popped up so far have been associated with jobs requiring a security clearance. Moscow Center thought that the background stories of the alleged spies could withstand a background check (paragraph 85 of the FBI affidavit); the sleepers themselves weren’t so sure. I’m with the sleepers.

I’ve been on the other end of background checks a number of times (i.e., investigators have asked me about students of mine) and I’ve always wondered about the efficacy of the process. If someone’s taken the birth certificate of a dead child to build a new identity, though, it would be tough to manufacture a lot of friends, neighbors, relatives, and teachers to confirm the legend.

Third, not all cosmopolitan people are spies, but a lot of spies claim to be cosmopolitan people. A striking number of the arrestees claim to be born in one place, citizens of another place, resident in a third (and none of those places Russia). That minimizes the odds of running into somebody from your ostensible home town who might ask awkward questions. And it makes checking somebody’s credentials much tougher. And (previewing the next comment) it helps to explain talking funny.

Fourth, accents are a problem. Even the arrestees with US or Canadian passports seemed to friends and neighbors to be vaguely European. That would almost certainly raise red flags in a background check, or even in interactions with people familiar with Russia and the former Soviet Union. During a research trip to Russia, I read The Charm School, a thriller by Nelson DeMille. The premise was a super-secret school to train Soviet spies to become totally Americanized. I couldn’t buy it–it’s just not possible to take someone past childhood and teach them to speak a foreign language without an accent.

In connection with the accusations presented in the USA in relation to the group of individuals suspected of intelligence activities on behalf of Russia, we communicate that we are discussing Russian citizens who have at various times turned out to be on American territory. They have carried out no actions directed against American interests.

We presume that . . . the American government will guarantee access to them by Russian consular officials and lawyers.

We count on the American side in this question displaying the necessary understanding, in particular bearing in mind the positive character of the current stage of development of Russian-American relations.

My initial reaction to this is disbelief that the Russian Foreign Ministry would say something so stupid.
1) Among other things, the statement has suddenly wrong-footed a whole lot of Russian commentators who said that the accusations couldn’t possibly be true, since no Russian spies would be so clumsy. That would include the Russian Foreign Ministry’s own spokesman who earlier had dismissed the whole thing as “baseless” and reminiscent of Cold War spy novels. Oops.
2) It has also confirmed that a whole lot of people with American or Canadian passports are in fact Russian, which rules out a host of defense strategies when these people go on trial. Though I’m no lawyer, it seems to me this also makes the suspects immediately guilty of using false passports (i.e., forgery). Can’t imagine their getting undercut like that is a comforting thought to the other Russian sleeper agents out there.
3) I note as well that the statement never actually denies that the individuals are spies, but instead only claims that they weren’t acting against American interests. That seems to me to fall into the category of “Don’t piss on my leg and tell me it’s raining.”
4) And it’s a basic element of intelligence tradecraft that you never confirm any individual’s status as a spy. But how else would the Russian Foreign Ministry know inside a day that a dozen individuals claiming to be anything but Russian citizens are in fact just that?

Given four egregiously dumb things in a three paragraph statement, how are we to read this? The Russian Foreign Ministry shouldn’t be that stupid. I see two possible interpretations. One would be a conflict between soft-line diplomats who’ve found their carefully-built rapprochement with the US disintegrating thanks to the cloak and dagger types over in the Foreign Intelligence Service, and are racing to try to repair the damage. The other would be a basic misreading of American politics. If the Foreign Ministry really thinks that this comes from right-wing forces inside the American government trying to derail relations with Russia, this may be an effort to try to make common cause with the Obama administration against the Russophobes. That seems to me fundamentally mistaken on lots of grounds. I’m certain that Obama wants good relations with Russia, but no American president can let foreign espionage just slide. Only Israel can spy on the US and get away without lasting political repercussions.