This neglects, of course, the imperial Russian army’s extensive purchases of weapons, particularly during World War I. It neglects the extensive Soviet purchase of systems, models and designs from abroad during the interwar period. The Soviet tank industry, for example, was essentially founded on designs from Vickers, Carden-Loyd, and Christie: the T-26, the T-27, and the BT series. And, of course, the Soviet Union used Western weaponry extensively during World War II as part of Lend-Lease.

In an accompanying survey of expert opinion, the Heritage Foundation’s Ariel Cohen quite rightly points to World War I and Lend-Lease, though not the interwar period closest to my heart. Sergei Maev, though, claimed that “During the First World War, tsarist Russia paid in gold for ten million rifles, but the rifles never reached our borders until the end of the Civil War.” In actual fact, looking just at the United States (I don’t have figures for other suppliers at hand), Russia ordered 3.6 million rifles, and had 400,000 delivered by the February Revolution. While I would never claim that as a sterling performance by American industry, it’s a long way from nothing. Maev, who’s head of DOSAAF, Russia’s chief voluntary organization supporting the military, and a former director of Rosoboronzakaz, really ought to know better.

Vatunin isn’t as well known in the West as he ought to be. His record at the 1943 Battle of Kursk and the subsequent liberation of southern Russia and eastern Ukraine from the Germans is an impressive one. Vatunin’s problem is that he died during the war, and as a result left no memoirs and played no role in the shaping of the war’s history in the way that comparable figures like Aleksandr Vasilevskii or Sergei Shtemenko could.

What the article focuses on, though, is Vatutin’s role as an “inconvenient [neudobnyi] general,” one who stood up to the country’s misguided political leadership on the eve of war. While this is an interpretation with obvious resonance in current circumstances of Russian military reforms that are opposed by the bulk of the high command, it’s not clear to me what grounds there are for this judgment in the historical record.

Vatutin’s rise to prominence postdated the 1937 purges, and so he didn’t have much opportunity to say anything especially controversial until 1938. While he did participate in the Main Military Council (the Soviet military’s collective deliberative body) in the pre-war years, it’s not clear that he said or did anything especially noteworthy. The Voice of Russia article cites Mikhail Miagkov to claim that Vatutin, not Georgii Zhukov, was the major force behind the May 1941 idea of a spoiling attack to disrupt Hitler’s obvious preparations for an invasion of the Soviet Union. This likewise seems to me to lack much foundation. Vatutin here seems to be useful as a man who spoke truth to power, and then conveniently died. To credit Zhukov as the real force urging more active measures against the Germans would bring in all sorts of complications with Zhukov’s subsequent political career.

What struck me, though, was how little the article made of the circumstances of Vatutin’s death. He was ambushed by Ukrainian nationalist partisans in early 1944, and died of his wounds in hospital. While the article certainly mentions this fact, it does little with it. Given the Kremlin’s current preoccupation with East European nationalist movements, and its tendency to label as “falsification” any history that sympathizes with them against the Soviets, this was a missed opportunity to lambast the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

Its subject is Col. Aleksei Nikolaevich Isakov the (now former) deputy director of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Lomonosov district (raion) of Lomonosov region (oblast) not far from St. Petersburg.

The video depicts the drunken colonel emerging from his office wearing only his MVD BVDs and…

Here’s the question: where in the piece is there a single specific example of a myth about the war that Russian historians have shattered? I say this not to demean the work of Russian historians, many of whom are doing fine research. I say it to point out a recurring aspect of Russian official and semi-official discourse on World War II, which is that it is plagued by evil-doing historians who mythologize and falsify the war. There’s never any specific indication of who exactly it is that is doing these terrible things, or of what exactly it is they say that is so awful and wrong.

“In sum, the old belief in congruence between national identity, territoriality, statehood and citizenship in the European Union is being challenged and undermined in three related ways. First, the supremacy of nation-states as institutions of governance is being eroded. Governance in Europe is becoming increasingly polycentric and multi-levelled. This involves the emergence of overlapping spheres of political authority at several spatial levels—local, regional, national and European.” (Gaddafi, p. 274)

“At the turn of the twenty-first century, the idea that there is or should be a congruence between national identity, territoriality, statehood and citizenship is being challenged and undermined in three related ways. First, the pre-eminence of nation-states as institutions of governance is being eroded . . . Governance in Europe is increasingly polycentric and multi-layered. For Anderson (1996) this involves the emergence of overlapping spheres of political authority at several spatial scales (local, regional, national and European). (Painter, p. 5)

“Second, in many parts of the world, state-based national identities are being challenged by regionalist or minority nationalist interests, undermining the alignment of identity and nation-state. Successful mobilisation behind regionalist goals can intensify the rate of reconfiguration of both governance and identity. Third, international migration has increased cultural diversity. Members of diasporas may form distinct regional populations, such as Russians in North-East Estonia, or they may be dispersed more evenly. Both situations will undermine the link between citizenship and national identity. In Estonia, Russians are even denied formal citizenship on grounds of ethnicity.” (Gaddafi, pp. 274-5)

“Second, in many parts of Europe state-based national identities are challenged by regionalist or minority nationalist identities. These challenges undermine the fit between identity and nation-state. In addition successful mobilisation behind regionalist goals can lead to increased political autonomy or secession, intensifying the restructuring of governance and potentially reconfiguring both the rights-based and the identity-based aspects of citizenship. . . . Third, international migration has increased cultural diversity. In some cases members of diasporas form distinct regional populations, such as the Russians in north-east Estonia (Smith and Wilson 1997). In other cases they may be dispersed more evenly. Both situations undermine the link between citizenship and national identity. In Estonia, Russians are denied even formal citizenship, on grounds of ethnicity.” (Painter, p. 5)

UPDATE: There’s a wiki listing other instances of plagiarism in the dissertation, none of which (at writing) overlap with mine):

The London School of Economics has come in for well-deserved heat (for example, here, here, here, here, here, and here) for its consorting with the Gaddafi clan, awarding Muammar’s son Saif a doctorate and getting back a multi-million dollar donation (though the check seems to have been delayed in the mail, only part of the funds having been received and actually spent).

Unseemly, certainly, but what if Said did the work and earned his Ph.D fair and square? Saif promised in his dissertation that “I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others.” His examiner Lord Desai declared “I grilled him for two hours on it — there was no suggestion he hadn’t written it himself.”

Oops. I spent an hour on google and found big chunks of plagiarized material, evidently not caught by the academics whom Saif thanks in his dissertation: Nancy Cartwright, David Held, Alex Voorhoeve, and Joseph Nye.

Compared to turning combat aircraft on crowds of civilians, cutting corners on your dissertation is small beer. But it does raise important questions about what happens to scholarly standards when big piles of money are involved. You can see Saif Gaddafi’s dissertation here.

The first set of suspicious passages I found came from a report by Tony Hill on UN cooperation with non-governmental organizations, available for download as a link on this page.

“Partly in response to the experience of NGO participation at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, a working group was established by ECOSOC in 1993 to begin a review and evaluation of relations with civil society, leading three years later to the adoption of Resolution 1996/31 as the formal, legal framework for UN-NGO relations.” (Gaddafi, p. 82)

“In 1993, partly in response to the experience of NGO participation in the Rio
Conference of 1992, a working group established by ECOSOC began a review
and evaluation of relations with NGOs and Civil Society, leading three years later to the adoption of Resolution 1996/31 as the formal, legal framework for UN-
NGO relations.” (Hill, p. 2)

“Resolution 1996/31 replaced Resolution 1296 of 1968, and advanced on it by explicitly opening up UN consultative status to national, regional and sub-regional NGOs . . . .” (Gaddafi, p. 82)

“Resolution 1996/31 replaced Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 1968 and
advanced on it by explicitly opening up UN consultative status to national NGOs . . .” (Hill, p. 2)

“The years following the adoption of Resolution 1996/31 have seen enormous growth in numbers of NGOs (many of them national) applying for consultative status, with the number of those acquiring it growing from 744 in 1992 to 2,350 in 2003. A growing backlog of applications (over 800, as of 2003) is waiting for review by ECOSOC’s committee on NGOs. (Gaddafi, p. 82)

“Over the seven years since 1996 there has been an exponential growth of NGOs, many of them national NGOs, applying for consultative status, with the number of those acquiring it growing from 744 in 1992 to 2,350 in 2003 with, today, a growing backlog of applications waiting for review by ECOSOC’s Committee on NGOs.” (Hill, p. 2)

I also found big chunks of material from the WTO’s website explaining how the organization works dumped wholesale into Gaddafy’s Appendix 3. Gaddafi has a footnote (# 546) saying he’s drawing information from the WTO website–that doesn’t do justice to what he’s in fact done.

“The WTO is ‘member-driven’: it is run by its member governments and all major decisions are made by the membership as a whole, either by ministers (who meet at least once every two years) or by their ambassadors or delegates (who meet regularly in Geneva). . . .” (Gaddafi, p. 396)

“The WTO is run by its member governments. All major decisions are made by the membership as a whole, either by ministers (who meet at least once every two years) or by their ambassadors or delegates (who meet regularly in Geneva).” (WTO)

“Topmost is the Ministerial Conference, which is the supreme body of the WTO, composed of representatives of all members, with the authority to carry out the functions of the WTO, take the actions necessary to this effect, and take decisions on matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements . . . .” (Gaddafi, p. 396)

“Topmost is the ministerial conference which has to meet at least once every two years. The Ministerial Conference can take decisions on all matters under any of the multilateral trade agreements.” (WTO)

“Six other bodies report to the General Council. Their scope is smaller, so they are merely ‘committees’, but they still consist of all WTO members. They cover issues such as trade and development, the environment, regional trading arrangements, and administrative issues.” (Gaddafi, p. 398)

“Six other bodies report to the General Council. The scope of their coverage is smaller, so they are “committees”. But they still consist of all WTO members. They cover issues such as trade and development, the environment, regional trading arrangements, and administrative issues.” (WTO)

“The Singapore Ministerial Conference in December 1996 decided to create new working groups to look at investment and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation.” (Gaddafi, p. 399)

“The Singapore Ministerial Conference in December 1996 decided to create new working groups to look at investment and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation.” (WTO)

“Two more subsidiary bodies dealing with the plurilateral agreements (which are not signed by all WTO members) keep the General Council informed of their activities regularly.” (Gaddafi, p. 399)

“Two more subsidiary bodies dealing with the plurilateral agreements (which are not signed by all WTO members) keep the General Council informed of their activities regularly.” (WTO)

“Each of the higher level councils has subsidiary bodies. The Goods Council has eleven committees dealing with specific subjects (market access, agriculture, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, subsidies and countervailing measures, anti-dumping measures, customs valuation, rules of origin, import licensing, trade-related investment measures, and safeguards). Again, these consist of all member countries. Also reporting to the Goods Council is the Textiles Monitoring Body, which consists of a chairman and ten members acting in their personal capacities, and groups dealing with notifications (governments informing the WTO about current and new policies or measures) and state trading enterprises.” (Gaddafi, p. 399)

“Each of the higher level councils has subsidiary bodies. The Goods Council has 11 committees dealing with specific subjects (such as agriculture, market access, subsidies, anti-dumping measures and so on). Again, these consist of all member countries. Also reporting to the Goods Council is the Textiles Monitoring Body, which consists of a chairman and 10 members acting in their personal capacities, and groups dealing with notifications (governments informing the WTO about current and new policies or measures) and state trading enterprises.” (WTO)

“The Services Council’s subsidiary bodies deal with financial services, domestic regulations, GATS rules and specific commitments.” (Gaddafi, p. 399)

“The Services Council’s subsidiary bodies deal with financial services, domestic regulations, GATS rules and specific commitments.” (WTO)

“At the General Council level, the Dispute Settlement Body also has two subsidiaries: the dispute settlement ‘panels’ of experts appointed to adjudicate on unresolved disputes, and the Appellate Body that deals with appeals.” (Gaddafi, p. 399)

“At the General Council level, the Dispute Settlement Body also has two subsidiaries: the dispute settlement “panels” of experts appointed to adjudicate on unresolved disputes, and the Appellate Body that deals with appeals.” (WTO)

“Important breakthroughs are rarely made in formal meetings of these bodies, least of all in the higher-level councils. Since decisions are made by consensus, without voting, informal consultations within the WTO play a vital role in bringing a vastly diverse membership to an agreement.” (Gaddafi, p. 400)

“Important breakthroughs are rarely made in formal meetings of these bodies, least of all in the higher level councils. Since decisions are made by consensus, without voting, informal consultations within the WTO play a vital role in bringing a vastly diverse membership round to an agreement.” (WTO)

“One step away from the formal meetings are informal meetings that still include the full membership, such as those of the Heads of Delegations (HOD). More difficult issues have to be thrashed out in smaller groups. A common recent practice is for the chairperson of a negotiating group to attempt to forge a compromise by holding consultations with delegations individually, in twos or threes, or in groups of 20-30 of the most interested delegations.” (Gaddafi, p. 400)

“One step away from the formal meetings are informal meetings that still include the full membership, such as those of the Heads of Delegations (HOD). More difficult issues have to be thrashed out in smaller groups. A common recent practice is for the chairperson of a negotiating group to attempt to forge a compromise by holding consultations with delegations individually, in twos or threes, or in groups of 20-30 of the most interested delegations.” (WTO)

“These smaller meetings have to be handled sensitively. It is necessary to ensure that everyone is kept informed about what is going on (the process must be ‘transparent’) even if they are not in a particular consultation or meeting, and that they have an opportunity to participate or provide input (the process must be ‘inclusive’).” (Gaddafi, p. 400)

“These smaller meetings have to be handled sensitively. The key is to ensure that everyone is kept informed about what is going on (the process must be “transparent”) even if they are not in a particular consultation or meeting, and that they have an opportunity to participate or provide input (it must be “inclusive”).” (WTO)

“One term has become controversial, but more among some outside observers than among delegations. The ‘Green Room’ is a phrase taken from the informal name of the director-general’s conference room. It is used to refer to meetings of 20–40 delegations, usually at the level of heads of delegations. These meetings can take place elsewhere, such as at Ministerial Conferences, and can be called by the minister chairing the conference as well as the director-general. Similar smaller-group consultations can be organised by the chairs of committees negotiating individual subjects, although the term Green Room is not usually used for these.” (Gaddafi, p. 400)

“One term has become controversial, but more among some outside observers than among delegations. The “Green Room” is a phrase taken from the informal name of the director-general’s conference room. It is used to refer to meetings of 20–40 delegations, usually at the level of heads of delegations. These meetings can take place elsewhere, such as at Ministerial Conferences, and can be called by the minister chairing the conference as well as the director-general. Similar smaller group consultations can be organized by the chairs of committees negotiating individual subjects, although the term Green Room is not usually used for these.” (WTO)

“In the past delegations have sometimes felt that Green Room meetings could lead to compromises being struck behind their backs, so extra efforts are made to ensure that the process is handled correctly, with regular reports back to the full membership.” (Gaddafi, p. 401)

“In the past delegations have sometimes felt that Green Room meetings could lead to compromises being struck behind their backs. So, extra efforts are made to ensure that the process is handled correctly, with regular reports back to the full membership.” (WTO)

“The way countries now negotiate has helped somewhat. In order to increase their bargaining power, countries have formed coalitions. In some subjects such as agriculture virtually all countries are members of at least one coalition—and in many cases, several coalitions. This means that all countries can be represented in the process if the coordinators and other key players are present. The coordinators also take responsibility for both ‘transparency’ and ‘inclusiveness’ by keeping their coalitions informed and by taking the positions negotiated within their alliances.” (Gaddafi, p. 401)

“The way countries now negotiate has helped somewhat. In order to increase their bargaining power, countries have formed coalitions. In some subjects such as agriculture virtually all countries are members of at least one coalition — and in many cases, several coalitions. This means that all countries can be represented in the process if the coordinators and other key players are present. The coordinators also take responsibility for both “transparency” and “inclusiveness” by keeping their coalitions informed and by taking the positions negotiated within their alliances.” (WTO)

“In the end, decisions have to be taken by all members and by consensus. The membership as a whole would resist attempts to impose the will of a small group. No one has been able to find an alternative way of achieving consensus on difficult issues, because it is virtually impossible for members to change their positions voluntarily in meetings of the full membership.” (Gaddafi, p. 401)

“In the end, decisions have to be taken by all members and by consensus. The membership as a whole would resist attempts to impose the will of a small group. No one has been able to find an alternative way of achieving consensus on difficult issues, because it is virtually impossible for members to change their positions voluntarily in meetings of the full membership.” (WTO)

“Market access negotiations also involve small groups, but for a completely different reason. The final outcome is a multilateral package of individual countries’ commitments, but those commitments are the result of numerous bilateral, informal bargaining sessions, which depend on individual countries’ interests. (Examples include the traditional tariff negotiations, and market access talks in services.)” (Gaddafi, p. 401)

“Market access negotiations also involve small groups, but for a completely different reason. The final outcome is a multilateral package of individual countries’ commitments, but those commitments are the result of numerous bilateral, informal bargaining sessions, which depend on individual countries’ interests. (Examples include the traditional tariff negotiations, and market access talks in services.)” (WTO)

“Thus, informal consultations in various forms play a vital role in allowing consensus to be reached, but they do not appear in organisation charts, precisely because they are informal.” (Gaddafi, p. 401)

“So, informal consultations in various forms play a vital role in allowing consensus to be reached, but they do not appear in organization charts, precisely because they are informal.” (WTO)

“They are not separate from the formal meetings, however. They are necessary for making formal decisions in the councils and committees. Nor are the formal meetings unimportant. They are the forums for exchanging views, putting countries’ positions on the record, and ultimately for confirming decisions. The art of achieving agreement among all WTO members is to strike an appropriate balance, so that a breakthrough achieved among only a few countries can be acceptable to the rest of the membership.” (Gaddafi, p. 402)

“They are not separate from the formal meetings, however. They are necessary for making formal decisions in the councils and committees. Nor are the formal meetings unimportant. They are the forums for exchanging views, putting countries’ positions on the record, and ultimately for confirming decisions. The art of achieving agreement among all WTO members is to strike an appropriate balance, so that a breakthrough achieved among only a few countries can be acceptable to the rest of the membership.” (WTO)

Putin condemns “any falsifications, any distortions of the history of World War II” as “a personal insult, a sacrilege.” As has become increasingly clear, though, these ritual denunciations of falsification don’t ever actually name individual falsifiers or specify what exactly it is that they have falsified. What had me excited about this message from Putin was the chance to get his sense of who’s doing good history. Sad to say, that opportunity was missed. Putin didn’t name any actual historians, Russian or Western, who are working on the war.

Instead, he suggests novels, all written under the Soviets. This isn’t necessarily bad advice, and he’s not suggesting bad books: Russians certainly know how to write novels, and even the Soviet Union couldn’t quash that. Nonetheless, the authors and books he recommends are quite instructive.

The names Putin gives us are standard figures in the Soviet pantheon of literature, who wrote books on the war that were perfectly politically correct: Konstantin Simonov, Mikhail Sholokhov, Boris Vasiliev, Konstantin Vorobiev, and in particular Vladimir Bogomolov. Bogomolov was a veteran of Soviet military counterintelligence (though there’s some controversy over his military service), and the book that Putin recommends (Moment of Truth, also known as In August 1944) glorifies the work of Smersh (Death to Spies) in restoring Soviet rule in liberated territory.

Two names leap out by their absence: Viktor Nekrasov and Vasilii Grossman. I’ve done no survey, but my sense is that if you asked people who really know literature about the best work to come out of the Great Fatherland War, Nekrasov and Grossman would be the first mentioned. So why doesn’t Putin mention them? I can’t speak for him, but Nekrasov ended up expelled from the Soviet Union and stripped of his citizenship, while Grossman couldn’t get his masterwork Life and Fate published because of the uncomfortable parallels he drew between Nazism and Stalinism. It certainly seems as though Vladimir Putin isn’t comfortable with writers who aren’t comfortable with the Soviet system.

Vera Trifonova died in April 2010. What makes her case noteworthy is not that charges were dropped once she was dead, but that “new charges were brought against Trifonova in October, five months after her death.”

According to Kommersant, which is one of the best Russian newspapers and generally reliable, a Colonel Shcherbakov (no other names given), head of the American desk of the clandestine service, handed over not just the names but also the actual files of the illegals working in the US before disappearing.

In an object lesson in the importance of going to original sources, the Russian-language version adds a little tidbit that does not appear in JRL’s English-language text: the reporters were told that “”They’ve already sent a Mercader after him.” That is, Ramon Mercader–the NKVD agent who assassinated Lev Trotsky in Mexico City. True or not, that is certainly what the Russian intelligence community would want Shcherbakov and any other potential Shcherbakov’s to think.

Kommersant’s follow-up story includes confirmation by a number of figures of the substance of its account. Member of the Duma’s Security Committee Gennadii Gudkov blames the whole affair on “total degradation of morality, when everything here is bought and sold.”

I’d be inclined to lay the responsibility on a total lack of tradecraft. If Kommersant is right, no one in the Foreign Intelligence Service noticed or cared that the head of clandestine operations against the US had a daughter in America. Is the problem that it’s hard to find members of the Russian elite who don’t have some relatives living, working, or studying abroad? If my circle of acquaintances is any measure (and I recognize the problematic nature of the sample), it could be quite difficult to find someone with a high-quality education and NO Western entanglements.

UPDATE: Russian media are now claiming that Shcherbakov was indeed a traitor, but that another individual inside the Foreign Intelligence Service, named Poteev (alternate transliteration Poteyev) is the one responsible for handing over the Russian spies to the FBI.